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THE JURISDICTION IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES IN
PENNSYLVANIA UNDER ACT OF 1871.
It is proposed in this article to discuss the first section of
the Act of June 19, 1871,1 as it is applied in eminent domain
cases in Pennsylvania. The section in question purports to fur-
nish a remedy against the unlawful acts of corporations, and,
while the act is not so expressed, the question of its application
has with a few exceptions, arisen where the defendant company
is attempting to exercise the power of eminent .domain, and the
discussion will be confined accordingly.
The section in effect provides that where the private rights
of individuals or corporations, or rights and franchises of cor-
porations are invaded by the act of a corporation, the court shall,
in any suit by the private party or corporation, inquire into
whether the corporation doing the act does, in fact, possess the
right or franchise to do the act complained of, and, if such
rights or franchises have not been conferred upon such corpora-
tion, the court shall allow the recovery of damages if the action
be at law, and, if in equity, shall restrain the doing of the act.
'p. L. 136o, Section r, which is as follows: "In all proceedings in courts
of law or equity of this commonwealth, in which it is alleged that the private
rights of individuals or the rights or franchises of other corporations are
injured or invaded by any corporation claiming to have a right or franchise
to do the act from which such injury results, it shall be the duty of the
court in which such proceedings are had, to examine, inquire and ascertain
whether such corporation does in fact possess the right- or franchise to do
the act from which such alleged injury to private rights, or to the rights
and franchises of other corporations, results, and if such rights or franchises
have not been conferred upon such corporation, such courts, if zxercising
equitable power, shall, by injunction, at suit of the private parties or other
corporations, restrain such injurious acts; and if the proceedings be at law
for damages, it shall be lawful therein to recover damages for such injury
as in other cases." The Act of April 8, 1846, P. L. 272, entitled an act "relat-
ing to the chancery powers of courts in the City and County of Philadelphia,"
provides "that no courts within the City and County of Philadelphia, shall
exercise the powers of a court of chancery, in granting or continuig injunc-
tions against the erection or use of any public works of any kind, erected or
in progress of erection, under the authority of an act of the legislature,
until the questions of title and damages shall be submitted, and finally de-
cided by a common law court." Wolbert v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. 439 (1865);
Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, 344 (875) ; Wheeler v. Rice, 83 Pa. 232
(187); Flanagan v.- Philadelphia, 8 Phila. Ixo (Pa. i87o).
(i72)
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It appears, when the act is closely examined, that it adds
little to the existing law. Jurisdiction was exercised in equity
before the act was passed,2 and an action of trespass would
clearly lie at comnmon law for an urlawful entry either by a cor-
poration or an individual.8
It seems to have geen generally assumed, however, that the
jurisdiction of the court to issue an injunction depends on the
act 4 and we shall, therefore, discuss it accordingly.5
' Comm. v. Erie R. R. Co., 27 Pa. 339 (x8s6), bill by Comm. and injunc-
tion issued, restraining construction by a railroad company not in accordance
with the terms of the charter; Stewart's App. 56 Pa. 413 (1868); Jarden v.
P., NV. & B. R. R., 3 Wharton 502 (1838); Unangst's App., 55 Pa. 128
(1867).
'Jessup v. Loucks, 55 Pa. 350 (£867) was an action on the case for un-
lawful damming of a stream.
'No case since the act, other than an equity proceeding, has been found
where the landowner has raised the question of the power to condemn ex-
cept: Philadelphia & Mferion Ry. Co.'s Petition, 187 Pa. 123 (1898) : Street rail-
way filed a petition for appointment of viewers to assess damages for oc-
cupancy of a turnpike; latter company moved to quash the proceedings, on
the ground that the petitioner had no legal right to lay a street
railway on the turnpike. Proceeding quashed; affirmed on appeal. The
turnpike could raise the question, because it was not an aVoidance of the
charter, as non constat the street railway could lay the tracks somewhere
else, but the street railway could not raise the question of forfeiture of the
charter right of the turnpike to lay a street railway, on the ground of
laches. A corporation without the power of eminent domain may invade the
property of an individual or the franchise of a corporation, but if such an act
is a trespass, there is a remedy in equity apart from the Act of 1871, e. g.,
Alexander v. Coal Co., 254 Pa. 1 (i916) ; Nugent v. Mining Co., 263 Pa. 230
(igig); Packard v. Theil College, 209 Pa. 340 (1904) [Act of i87£ refer-
red to not in point.]
'It is clear that the railroad is not covered by the alleged charter,
"which if inquired into by the commonwealth in a quo warranto might end
in a judgment of ouster. This power of inquiry by the first section of
the Act of June 19, I871, P. L 136o, may be exercised by this court, where,
as in this case, the private right of an individual is injured and invaded by
this corporation, claiming to have a right or franchise to do the act from
which such injury results." Reed, J., in McCandless's Appeal, "o Pa. 210, 216
(£872). Gordon, J., said the Act of June io, 1871 P. L. I36i enables a
private citizen by bill in equity, to call upon a corporation to show by its
charter that it has the power to do a certain act, or, on the other hand, the
complainant may show from the charter that powers once possessed by the
corporation have been forfeited by lapie of time or otherwise. The act con-
templates nothing more than that it shall be made to appear from the charter
that the said corporation has the power to do the act in question. It does not
authorize a private citizen to assume the position of the Commonwealth. West-
ern Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 104 Pa. 399 (1884).
"An inquiry as to whether certain powers are or are not conferred by
a charter is not open to the objection that the validity of the charer is assailed
in a collateral proceeding. Such inquiries are expressly authorized by the
Act of June ig (187 )." Sterrett, J., in Sterling's Appeal, it Pa. 35, o (1886).
"In some of the earlier cases effort was made to stretch the act to
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The remedy by injunction is very necessary, because when a
landowner excepts to the appointment of viewers in the court
confer on private parties the authority previously exercised by the com-
monwealth to inquire into the abandonment or forfeiture of franchises, but
-it was held that the act did not confer on the individual the general author-
ity of the commonwealth, but that under it the inquiry must be restricted tok
the existence of franchises as shown by the charter: Western Penna. R. R.
Co.'s Appeal, io4 Pa. 399. Hence the terms 6f the grant in the charter were
usually spoken of as the test of the validity of the corporation's action, and,
so far as the grant is concerned, that is still, as it always has been, the con-
clusive test. But it was never decided or intended to be that the failure of
the grant could not be shown either from the charter itself or aliunde. Thus,
in the cabe last cited, it was held that the complainant might show from the
charter that the franchise had lapsed or expired, and the cases on passenger
railways, cited .upra, rest on proof outside of the charter that other legal
requirements for the validity of the challenged action were wanting. The
language of the charter therefore is not the sole test of the validity of the
acts complained of. The purpose of the act of 1871 was to enable individuals
to protect their private property and rights against unlawful and unauthor-
ized interferencc by corporate action directly and without the necessity- of
invoking the aid of the commonwealth. The injury to the complainant is the
same whether the illegality or want of authority arises from the charter
or otherwise. What he challenges is the existence of present lawful author-
ity to do the thing that injures him, and to that end he may avail himself
of any defect in the authority set up, however arising." Mitchell C. J., in Ed-
wards v. R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 597, 603 (igo6). Inquiry under the Act of 187x
is "always limited to a consideration of the question 'Does the corporation
possess the power to do what it is attempting to do?' and not whether it is
exercising its powers in an improper manner." Elkin, J., in Colliery Co. v. R.
R. Co., 226 Pa. 131, 135 (19o). The Act (1871) applies to direct invasion of
rights, not consequential injuries resulting from contractual relations and the
inquiry is limited in suits by private parties to the question of charter pow-
ers." Elkin, J., in Blankenburg v. R. Transit Co., 228 Pa. 338 (9xo).
"This act (1871) permits an individual to contest the right of a corpora-
tion to do certain acts. It has been uniformly held that under this act, the
inquiry is limited to the question whether or not the defendant has the right
or power to do the particular act complained of. If it appears such power
exists, the authority of the court to interfere is at an end." Frazer, J., in Wil-
liams v. D., L & W. R. R., 255 Pa. 133, 144 (1916). In Mountz v. R. R. Co.,
265 Pa. 67 (igig), where the Supreme Court affirmed the refusal to issue a
preliminary injunction restraining the construction of a branch road, the
court below [King, P. J.] said that under the Act of 1871, the courts have
the right of inquiry at the instance of a private party, but that inquiry is
limited to the nature and extent of the franchise prima facie conferred by the
charter itself, and that, if the corporation defendant is abusing its franchise or
is acting in bad faith with a purpose of evading its duties as a public service
corporation, the Commonwealth is the proper party to inquire. See discus-
sion by Moschisker, C. J., in Gring v. Water Co., 27o Pa. 232 (1921), and
statement on pages 238-239 where he said that it "will be found that the
cases where relief was granted all fall within one of the following classes:
(1) those in which the corporation had no charter right to do the thing
complained of (2) those in which, though the power was apparently given
by the corporation's charter, it was attempted to be exercised in a manner, for
a purpose or to an extent not authorized by law; (3) those wherein a power,
that ordinarily would exist under the charter, was attempted to be exercised in
violation of an agreement previously made by the corporation, which, under
THE JURISDICTION IN EMIENT DOMAIN CASES
below and the exceptions are dismissed, the order is interlocu-
tory, and an appeal by the landowner will be dismissed.6 If
the exceptions are sustained, the order is final as to the corpora-
tion, which may appeal, and on the appeal the landowner may
raise the questions- he might under the Act. of -1871. 7 So also
the order approving the bond filed in the statutory proceedings
decides nothing, as to the power-to condemn is interlocutory and
not appealable by statute. The court may withhold approval
of the bond pending determination of the question in the equity
proceedings. 9
The general principles of equity practice are applicable, and
the court will not take jurisdiction when the title is in dispute,1"
nor will an injunction issue when the inconvenience to the de-
fendant is greater than the inconvenience to the plaintiff."'
Since, however, the landowner is entitled to protection from an
unlawful taking, irrespective of the amount of the damages, it is
the attending circumstances, was to be viewed "as though named in the char-
ter"; (4) those in which, though ample power was given by the charter, it was
conditioned upon the precedent doing of certain things that had not been done;
(5) those wherein the power granted by the charter was to be exercised only
on consent of some other public body or bodies, and such consent had not
been granted, or had been given on a condition which had not been fulfilled
or had been broken; (6) those in which, though the power was conferred by
defendant's charter, some other corporation, also having power so to do, had
precedently exercised its like right, and, under the circumstances, it would
have been illegal or inequitable to disturb the latter." See Pioneer Coal Co.
v. I. R. Co., 272 Pa. 43, 48 (1922).
'Water Co. v. Gring, :?57 Pa. 34o (1917); Water Co. v. Brumbaugh, 246
Pa. 22S (1914).
'Philadelphia & Merion Ry. Co.'s Petiti on, 187 Pa. 123 (x898); Crescent
Pipe Line Co.'s Petition, 56 Pa. Super. 2o1 (1914); Phila. Parkway, 258 Pa.
252 (1917) ; but see Kensington Plan, 2 Rawle 445 (830) ; Petition of Ban-
gor, etc., L R. Co., 8 Pa. Dist. R. 65 (i898).
'Socum's Appeals, 12 W. N. C. 84 (Pa. 1882); Water Co; v. Brum-
baugh, 246 Pa. 225 (1914); Market Co. v. R. R. Co., 142 Pa. .80 (i89I);
Blandburg Water Co.'s Condemnation, 233 Pa. 230 (1911); Getz v. P. & R. R.
R., i Walker 427 (Pa. 1879). The owner filed a bill for an. injunction, and the
condemnor filed a plea setting up the statutory proceedings and filing of the
bond and approval thereof, whereupon the court dissolved the preliminary in-
junction and relegated the owner to his remedy on the bond. The Supreme
Court on certiorari refused to review the action of the court in approving
the bond, which approval settled nothing as to the right of the company to
condemn. R. R. Co. v. Gamble, 2o4 Pa. i98 (i9ow), order fixing amount of
bond not appealable.
'Kincaid v. R. R. Co., 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 54S (xgor).
"Marshall v. Pa. Co., 44 Pa. Super.- 68 (i910).
Becker v. Street Railwa#, 188 Pa. 484 (1898).
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not necessary to allege or prove irreparable damage. 12  The
landowner will be barred by laches just as in other equity pro-
ceedings. 1 3 The owner may not, however, urge that a particular
damage will be inflicted when he has an adequate remedy at law
for the particular damage.1
4
In granting a preliminary injunction the court will be gov-
erned by the considerat ions usually applicable in such cases.15
"Groff's Appeal. 128 Pa. 621 (i889). Construction of turnpike road
would have benefited plaintiff. Hopkins v. Manufacturing Co., i8o Pa. x99
(1897); Citizens Electric Co. v. Boom Co., 227 Pa. 448 (19io); bill in,
equity filed against the Boom Co. to compel the opening of the gates of a
dam. Plaintiff had a right under a deed from A to the use of a strip of
land for a mill race to convey water to mills to be erected by the grantee, and
for no other use whatsoever. Mills were destroyed in z889, and never re-
built, so plaintiff had no right to have the witer come down to the millrace. The defendant company had acquired the premises under eminent
domain so the remedy of the plaintiff was" on the bond for damages, and
in no event would equity issue an injunction.
"Landowner barred by lacies in the following cases: I-ankey v. Phila7
delphia Co., 5 Pa. Super. 148 (1897) ; Maust v. St. Ry., 2i9 Pa. 568 (i9o8) ;
Condron v. Pa. R. R., 233 Pa., 197' (1911); Groff y. Turnpike Co., 144 Pa.
750 (18DT) ; Biddle v. Water Works, i9o Pa. 94 (x89g). Viewers made re-
port and landowner had appealed and bill in equity filed thereafter; Keeling
v. R. R. Co., 2o5 Pa. 31 (i9o3) ; Injunction filed by abutting owner against
carrying out of contract between R. R. Co. and city. Contract executed
April 13, 19oi, bill filed June 27, 19o-in the meantime the R. R. Co. had
begun work and spent money. Stewart Wire Co. v. Lehigh Navigation
Co., 2o3 Pa. 474 (To2): Injunction refused riparian owner against diver-
sion of water after delay of many months. Damage trifling and easily cam-
pensated by action at law. Youse v. McCarthy, 5i Pa. Super. 3o6 (ir2),
standing by for time less than statutes of limitations; bill dismissed without
prejudice, action at law brought 23 Pa. Dist. R. 76o (1974). Chew v. Phila.,
257 Pa.. 589 (1917) ; McClane v. McClane, 2T3 Pa. -86 (19o6); s. ." 207 Pa.
465 ( 904) : The court rested the case on the ground of estoppel of the- plain-
tiff to contest the defendant's right of way. Bill sustained on terms that R. 1R.
Co. comply with a certain agreement to maintain crossings. Wilson'Towhship v.
Easton Transit Co., 258 Pa. 266 (1917) : Township standing by and acquiescing
in certificate of public convenience by Public Service Cbmmission cannot
subsequently have an injunction restraining cbnstruction of a street railway
on ground of lack of proper consent by Township. Act. of i871 not men-
tioned.
"Williams v. D., L. & W. R. R., 255 Pa. 133 (ix6): Failure to provide
farm crossings. Murdoch v. Pittsburg, 256 Pa. 268 (1917): Removal of
switch in street by changing grade.
. Preliminary injunction granted. Boro. v. R. R. Co., 241 Pa. 357 (igr3) ;
Pfoutz v. Telephone Co., 27 C. C. R. 6o2 (1902) ; Peifly v. Water Co., 214 Pa.
340 (i9o6). Preliminary injunction refused. Eastman v. Water Co, m Pa.
355 (i9o8) ; Murdoch v. Pittsburg, 256 Pa. 268 (1917) ; Mountz v. R. R. Co.,
-65 Pa. 67 (1919); Lejee v. R. R. Co., io Phila. 362 (1875); Nugent v. Miia-
ing Co., 263 Pa. 230 (igig); R. R. Co. v. Coal Co., et al, 24 Pa. Co. Ct.
Yo4 (igoo); Boro v. Electric Transmission Co.,- 32 Pa. Co. Ct. 91 (igoo), Pa.
. R. v. Street Railway Co., 176 Pa. 559 (1896). Preliminary injunction is-
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The plaintiff has -no standing to apply for an injunction
unless he can show clear title to a special property which will be
damaged by the act of the corporation defendant. Therefore, a
borough cannot have an injunction to restrain occupation of its
streets by a street railway which has power to lay its tracks
without municipal consent."6  A private citizen has no standing
to compel specific performance of -a contract entered into be-
tween the municipality, of which lie is a citizen, and a street
railway company. relating to rates 'of fare.17 Individuals not
owners of abutting property cannot complain of the-unlawful
constructionof a street railway in the street.' 8  A. railroad. com-
pany cannot enjoin the construction of a street railway on the
ground that operation of the street railway diminished its re-
ceipts. 9 -A stockholder of a street railway cannot restrict the
company from occupying the streets of a city.20 A railway
company whose right of way crossed a turnpike and which
owned in fee the abutting land on each side of the turnpike at
the point of crossing, is not entitled to an injunction restraining
a street railway from constructing its tracks on the turnpike, the
company having the consent of all the other owners.21 The court,
-furthermore, will not take jurisdiction where- the title is in
dispute.
22
Nor will an injunction issue when it clearly appears that
the defendant company is not iritending to take the land Without
filing a bond.
23
sued and dissolved when bond filed and approved by the court, Bland v.
Water Co., 222 Pa2. 285 (igo8).
"Borough v. R. . Co., 205 Pa. 402 (1903).
"'Blankenburg v. Rapid Transit Co., 228 Pa. 338 (gio).
"Andet v. St. Ry., 2i9 Pa. 635 (19o8) : The plaintiffs were individuals wha
had filed articles of association in the office of the Secretary of the Common-
wealth, but to whom no letters patent had been issued, and it was held
on that ground also, that they had no standing.
"Penna. R. R. v. Street Ry. Co., 176 Pa. 559 (1896).
"Seitz, et at., v..Traction Co., 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 469 (1888).
' Pa. R. R. v. Street Ry. Co., 176 Pa. 559 (1896), R. R. Co. v. Traction
Co.; 205 Pa. 579 (19o5).
" Marshall v. R. R. Co., 44 Pa. Super. 68 (igro) ; Street Ry. v. Street Ry.,
219 Pa. 558 (i9o8), semble.
"Hey v. Water Co., 207 Pa. 38 (19o3).
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The court will not inquire into whether a charter has been
forfeited by failure (a) to complete the works within the time
fixed,2 4. (b) by abandonment,23 (c) by failure of bona fide organ-
ization within a certain time,261 (d) or by failure in good faith to
commence the construction of the works.2 7 Nor will the court in-
quire whether the charter has expired by non-user of grant 
28
nor grant an injunction on the ground that a water company
is supplying a part of the water outside the territorial limits.2 1
In like manner a landowner may not raise the question of the
eligibility of the directors of the defendant corporation to act
as directors in passing the necessary resolutions,3 0 nor any ques-
tion of the proper exercise of discretion by the directors of the
company as to the amount of land needed,"1 nor set up.that the
defendant railroad company was composed of the unlawful
merger of two parallel and competing roads.3 2
An abutting owner may have an injunction against an un-
lawful occupation of a township r6ad amounting to an addi-
tional servitude,3 3 against occupation of a street without lawful
'Olyphant, etc., Co. v. Olypharnt Boro., i96 Pa. 553 (igoo): Bill by boro
to restrain construction on boro streets. Hoffman's Appeal zo W. N. C. 4o
(Pa. 1882) ; Gas & Water Co. v. Downington, 193 Pa. 255 (1899): Bill by
water company to restrain interference by boro, which could not set up
failure of plaintiff to furnish sufficient water. Injunction issued.
'Western Pennsylvania R. R. Co.'s Appeal, io4 Pa. 399 (1884): In-
junction refused plaintiff to prevent another company from crossing its
ttracks at grade. Decree entered providing manner of crossing. Affitmed on
appeal.
Lejee v. St. Ry. Co., io Phila. 362 (1875).
Turnpike Company v. Electric Ry., 0 - Pa. - .
U Hinchman v. Turnpike Co., i6o Pa. i5o (1894), dictum.
"Croyle v. Water Co.,'259 Pa. 484 (i9x8); Panther Valley Water Co.
v. R. R. Co., 43 Pa. Co. Ct. 315 (915): R. R. unlawiully appropriating water
troth a stream cannot set up, in defense to a bill in equity by water company,
a lower riparian owner which had earlier condemned, the circumstance thiat
plaintiff had exceeded its charter rights in furnishing water for industrial
purposes.
p Williams v. D., L & W. R. R., 255 Pa. z33 (1916).
Chew v. Phila., 257. Pa. 589 (x97) ; Tibby Bros. Gas Co. v.. Pa. R. R.,
219 Pa. 43o (:908); Price v. Pa. R. R., 209 Pa. 81 "(19o4); see Mountz V..
RL R. Co., 265 Pa. 67 (IM).
UTibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Pa. R. R., 2i9 Pa. 43o (i18).
'Young v. Transmission Co., 32 Pa. Co. Ct. 8z (i9o6) ; Pfoutz v. Tele-
phone Co., 27 C. C. R. 6o2 (1902), erection of poles; Sterling's Appeal, iri
Pa. 35; (1886), laying of pipes; Pa. R. R. v. Pass. R. Co., 167 Pa. 62 (z895);
injunction granted railroad company as owner in fee against construction of
a street railway company, which had not obtained local consent of all authori-
ties along the route.
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authority, although not an additional servitude 3 4 and against
use of the street contrary to law.s5
The power of eminent domain must be exercised in strict
compliance with the statutory requirements and, therefore the
landowner may have an injunction restraining the taking unless
and until the requirements have been complied with.- Thus, if
the corporation proceeds without filing a bond, an injunction
will issue restraining further proceedings until a bond has been
filed.3" So also the court will inquire into the sufficiency and
* form of the resolution'locating the works,37 and into the validity
of a city ordinance providing for widening and changing the
grade of a street.38
Condemnation by a water company will be restrained where
it appears that the water to be appropriated will be supplied
to the public outside the territorial -limits of the company;"9 but
Hopkins v. Mfg. Co., iSo Pa. gg (1897) ; Wirth v. St. Ry. Co., 2 W. N.
C.65o (Pa. i8,6); Penna. R. YL Co.s Appeal,.ii5 Pa. 54 (i886); Barker v.
Hartman Steel Co., 129 Pa. 551 (889); Potts v. Elevated R. R., r6r Pa.
396 (1894); Hannum v. Street Ry. Co., 2oo Pa. 44 (xgoa); Morey v. R. R.
Co., 199 Pa. 152 (19o).
'Edwards v. R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 597 (igo6).; Hannum v. Ry. Co., 221
Pa. 454 (igo), injunction refused.
" Bly v. Water Co., 197 Pa. 8o (itoo); Bland v. Water Co, 222 Pa. 285
(i9o8) ; but where the com'pany has used the water for sixteen years before
plaintiff purchased the land, the fact that bond filed has not been approved
is immaterial. Blauch v. Water Co., 247 Pa. 71 (1915) ; Davis v. Pipe Lines,
34 Pa. Super. 438 (i9o7), affirmed 223 Pa. 56 (i99) ; injunction issued un-
less corporation, within period fixed, proceeds according to law. An action
of trespass had previously been brought and recovery had for nominal dam-
age. Sterling's Appeal, xi Pa. 35 (1886); Turnpike Co. v. Railway Co., x77
Pa. 585 (896); see Rudolph v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 430 (1895): bill dismissed;
and Rudolph ir. R. R. Co., 186 Pa. 54i 0899) : stautory proceedings.
"Williams v. D., L & W. R. R., 255 Pa. 133 (ig96). See Pioneer Coal
Co. v. R R. Co., 272 Pa. 43 (1922), where failure of condemnor to prove that
resolution was passed by the directors .was held immaterial.
" Murdoch v. Pittsburg, 256 Pa. 268. (1917): there is no right to an in-
junction where the bond has been filed in proper proceedings, the title having
been divested and the owner relegated to the remedy on the bond, Citizens'
Electric Co. v. Boom Co., 227 Pa. 448 (r916). Where, in a proceeding against
a water company under the Act of 187z, the chancellor finds that a necessity
existed for a greater supply of water in the "territory presently served" by
defendant and another company which it had leased, but the record fails to
show'that the certificate called for by the Act of June 7, 190o1, P. . 455, to
validate the lease, had been filed, a decree for defendant will be reversed, and
the case remitted for hearing as to whether such certificate had been filed, and
for such other findings and conclusions as may be demanded by the facts
developed, and the effect which must be given to the Act of i9o7, as the court
may view it; Gring v. Vater Co., 270 Pa. 232 (x92x).
" Bly v. Water Co., 197 Pa. 8o (igoo)..
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where a-part only of the water is to be supplied outside the lim-
its, the injunction will be refused, the partial unlawful user being
a matter only for the Commonwealth to inquire into.
4 0
It has been said by way of dictum that the lafidowner can
raise the question of whether the land condemned is reasonably
necessary to the conduct of the business of the company."1
A municipal corporation may have an injunction against
occupation of its street without its consent, if consent is neces-
sary, and to enforce compliance by a street railway with condi-
tion annexed to grant of right to use streets.'
2
A public use may be plaintiff, and have an injunction re-
straining another corporation exercising the power of eminent
domain, from taking any of its property without lawful author-
ity. In these cases the court will inquire into whether in fact the
condemning corporation has shown sufficient necessity for the
taking, in addition to the lawful authority. a So also one rail-
road company may have an injunction restraining another rail-
road company from crossing its tracks.44 An injunction will
'Bland v. Water Co., = Pa. 285 (ixo8); see opinion of Brown, J., at
p. 29o; Croyle v. Water Co., 259 Pa. 484 (918) ; Miier v. Water Co., 250 Pa.
536 (1915): case slumbered for twelve years without prosecution; Blauch v.
Water Co., 247 Pa. 71 (1915).
'Elkin, J., in Raystown Water Co. v. Brumbaugh, 246 Pa. 225, 228
(1914); see Burkhard v. Water Co., 254 Pa. 41 (1912); Boalsburg Water Co.
v. Water Co. 24o Pa. I98 (i913): court inquired into whether the com-
pany was attempting to condemn more water than its necessities required.
Phila. v. P. & R. R. R., 25 W. N. C. 320 (Pa. i889) ; McKeesport v. Ry.
Co., 12 Pa. Dist. R. 541 (i9o3) : no reference to Act of 1871.
"Appeal of Sharon Ry. Co., 122 Pa. 533 Cr888); R. R. Co.s Appeal, 122
Pa. 511 (1886); Boalsburg Water Co. v. Water Co., 240 Pa. x98 (1913);
Schuylkill Valley R. R. v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 157 Pa. 42 (1893);
i60 Pa. 232 (18A); 167 Pa. 5/6 (1895).
. " R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 193 Pa. x27 (i8&9).- Same case on preliminary
injunction: 186 Pa. 212 (1898). Where one R. R. Co. has the burden of
maintaining a crossing of its line by a narrow gauge R. R., it may raise the
question of the power of the narrow gauge R. R. Co. to widen its gauge, and
accordingly a bill by the narrow gauge R. R. Co. for an injunction to re-
strain the aforesaid mentioned R. R. Co. from interfering with the widen-
ing, will be dismissed where it appears that narrow guage R. R. Co. has no
power to widen; R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 241 Pa. 6o8 (1913): injunction
granted a standard gauge railroad company against a grade crossing of its
tracks by a narrow gauge railroad without authority to make the crossing.
Western Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. 155 (1881); Western Penna. R.
R. Co.'s Appeal, io4 Pa. 399 (1883) ; Passenger Ry. v. Passenger Ry., r5i Pa.
138 (1892), 9. c. 3r W. N. C. 281 (Pa. 1892); affirming 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 638
('89).
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also issue to restrain laying tracks in street already occupied by
tracks of complainant.
4 5
There is a conflict in authority in answer to the question
whether the landowner can have an injunction on the ground of
improper use of the franchise, where the power of eminent d.-
main is granted. The real principle involved seems to be this:
If th! improper 'use goes to the heart of the enterprise, so that
there will be no taking. if there is, only a proper use, the land-
owner should have ai. injunction; but if the taking would be
carried out, even if confined to a proper use, the question should
be left to the Commonwealth, as an injunction would be useless,
since the corporation could immediately turn around and make
a re-entry confining itself to a proper use.4
6 "
Passenger Ry. v. Passenger Ry., 15 Pa Co. Ct. 498 (1894) : preliminary
injunction refused as plaintiff's case was not clear at early stage of the
proceedings. St. Ry. v. St. Ry. Co., 219 Pa. 558 (908); Light and Power
Co.'s Appeal, 27 Pa. Co. Ct. i (19o2); St. Ry. Co. v. Ry. Co., 2o6 Pa. 40 (:903):
injunction issued to prevent interference with exclusive privilege in highway
during period fixed in Act of Assembly. . St. Ry. v. St. Ry., 137 Pa.. 533
(I890); St. Ry. v. St. Ry., 18 Pa. Super. 5Z4 (i90o); inj. refused.
P. R. R. v. Lilly Boro., 207 Pa. 18o (i9o3) : application by R. 1. Co.
for an injunction to restrain borough from interfering with construction of
telegraph lines along defendant's right of way in public highway. of the bor-
ough. "Injunction refused as the railroad had the right to construct the
line and the court could not inquire into the purpose of the company in
constructing the telegraph nor into the use intended to be made by it. Windsor
Glass Co. v. Carnegie Co., 2o4 Pa. 459 (i903): bJI alleged that the corporation
was a cloak for the operation, under-a railroad charter, of a private railroad
operated exclusively for the benefit of the defendant's manufacturing plant.
Court refused the injunction and said that the inquiry was into the conduct
of the defendant under the charier, a matter exclusively for the Common-
wealth, and that the real complaint was that the defendant did not furnish
passenger car stations or freight cars for public use. That Edgewood R. R.
Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. 25 (1875) was a case, not of omission to. do acts au-
thorized by the charter, but of the doing of acts not authorized by the
charter. Colliery Co. v. R. R. Co., 226 Pa. 131 (xgio): injunction refused
against a corporation chartered under the Act of 1868. Plaintiff alleged
that proceeding was ax: unlawful attempt to procure a railroad for private
use. Court below found that public necessity demanded construction and
operation of the road; -hat the statement of the witnesses fully explafied
away the seeming doubtful actions of the defendant company. See however:
Laird v. Pittsburg, 205 Pa. 1 (1903): bill in equity by owner to- restrain city
from condemning land for a public park on the ground that the city in-
tended to -use the land in order to extend a free library and art building al-
ready standing on other land (part of the public park). Bill dismissed. Mit-
chell, J., said, at page 14, that the bill might be dismissed on the technical
grounds that the power of the city to acquire land for park purposes is un-
disputed and the ordinance and proceedings regular, but that nevertheless the
case will be dealt with on tl:e merits, the real ground of controversy being
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An injunction will issue When the evidence shows that the
works about to be constructed are authorized by another act of
assembly, even though the act under which the defendant is
proceeding clearly confers the power of eminent domain. 47
As the power of eminent domain in Pennsylvania can only
be exercised by corporations having public duties, the court will
issue an injunction whenever the power is attempted to be exer-
cised by private individuals or private business companies.
48
that the use proposed to be made of the land is not within the legitimate
scope of park purposes. Howley v. Central Valley R. R., 213 Pa. 36 (igo5):
owner had interfered with the construction of a railroad chartered under the
Act of 1868, and had been perpetually enjoined from such interference. After
the construction had proceeded, he applied for an injunction on the ground
that it was 'proposed to operate the road with electricity. The court brushed
aside the objection that the question could not be raised and after lengthy
discussion refused the injunction.
"Thus an injunction will issue against the construction of a railroad al-
though defendant incorporated under the Act of x868, and charter powers are
clear, when the evidence shows that the road is to be constructed and used
as an electric railway; M6rey v. R. R Co., 199 Pa. 152 (i9oi), abutting
owner obtained injunction against construction in a borough street. Kincaid
v. R. R. Co., 25 Pa. Co. Ct. s45 (i9o:), owner obtained injufiction against
taking of part of his land. Edgwood R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 70 Pa. 257 (1875),
injunction issued against the construction of a railroad chartered under the
Act of i868 and supplement, as it was in fact a lateral railroad and should
have been constructed under the statutes applicable. Collins v. Northeastern
Elev. R. R. Co., 2 Pa. Dist P. 417 (1893)-; Gaw v. . R. Co., 196 Pa. 442
(igoo), s. c. ii Montg. Co. Rep. 73 (Pa.); the owner failed to prove
that the construction under the Act of i86o was for the purpose of evad-
ing the former decree of the court and supplying the necessary lines in
street railway system_ Oliver v. Thompson's Run Bridge Co., 197 Pa. 344"
(rgoo), s. c. ii Montg. Co. Rep. 73 (Pa.) ; Contended that the bridge was
being built to obtain passage across a ravine for a street railway, which other-
wise could not cross. Supreme Court recognizing the validity of the conten-
tion, said the facts showed a public necessity for the bridge, apart from the
street railway.
" Stewart's Appeal, 56 Pa. 413 (1867), contruction of railroad by in-
dividual without authority. McCandlest's" Appeal, 7b Pa. 210 (1872): in-
jiunction issued directing the removal of a private railroad built by private
parties without authority of law. The road had been enjoined (Stewart's
Appeal, 56 Pa. 413 [1867]), and then iold to a railioad company duly incor-
porated. Peifly v. Water Company, 2r4 Pa. 34o (igo6): the court granted
a preliminary injunction saying that under its charter the defendant com-
pany was presumably a corporation for private purposes, and could not con-
stitutionally be invested with the power of eminent domaih. Phila. Clay Co.
v. York. Clay Co., 24I Pa. 305 (1913): construction of private tramway under
Act of June 5, igi1, P. L. 167, on a private road laid out under Acts of-April
4, igoi, P. L 65, and May 17, 1901, P. L 259. Public had no right to use
the tramway and therefore there was no public use.-The defendant was a
private business company having no public duties and therefore could not be
invested with the power of emnent domain, and, as the act did iot declare
the tramway, which was tQ be constructed, a public use, the question whether
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. An injunction was issued in one case 49 where it was de-
cided that the act authorizing the construction was unconstitu-
tional because the use was private, and in another case 0 the
court refused to consider the unconstitutionality of the incorpor-
ating act, which was defective in that the subject. matter was
not clearly expressed in the title.
The cases are difficult to reconcile and it is believed that
the earlier case expresses the true view. If the owner cannot,
by injunction, protect property from invasion under an uncon-
stitutional act, he is practically without a remedy.
- The coirt is required by the act to ascertain whether the
defendant corporation does in fact possess the right to do the
act, and if the power has not been conferred to issue an
injunction against the doing of the act. There is a slight incon-
sistency here, because the corporation may have clear
legislative power and yet the surrounding circumstances may
lead to the conclusion that the power conferred may not
be exercised. There are two views of the construction of the
act, which are contending for supremacy in the opinions of the
Supreme Court.51 One is that, when the power is conferred,
it was such, is to be determined by the court under all the facts of the case.
Waddell's App., 84 Pa. 90 (877), construction by individual of private
right of way under the unconstitutional act of June 13, 1874 P. L 286.
When a bill in equity is filed against a water company to restrain it
from exercising the right of eminent domain on the ground that the com-
pany is merely a corporation for private use, a preliminary injunction is
properly refused where it is established to the satisfaction of the court
that the defendant is a public service corporation; Eastman v. Water Co.,
Pa. 355 (i9o8), facts obscurely reported.
'Waddell's Appeal, 84 Pa. 9o (1877).
" Burkdard v. Water Co., 234 Pa. 41 (1912).
"In the following cases of corporations chartered under the Act of
1868, the facts alleged by the owner were held insufficient to warrant the is-
suing of an injunction: Getz's Appeal, io W. N. C. 453 (Pa. 1881); siding to
private property. Rochester Coal Co. v. R. R. Co., 24 Pa. Co. Ct. io4 (igoo),
branch to private mining operation; Mountz v. R. R. Co., 265 Pa.
67 (19); Pioneer Coal Co. v. R. R. Co., 272 Pa. 43 (1922), acc. Slocum's
Appeal, 12 W. N. C. 84 (Pa. 1882), straightening track, acquiring siding to
facilitate general freight business. Price v. P. R. R, 2o9 Pa. 81
"('9o4), construction of branch line used exclusively for freight; Rudolph
v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 43o (1895), acc. Deemer v. R. R. Co., 212 Pa. 491
(igo5), construction of railroad through undeveloped country. Market Co. v.
R. t.Co., z42 Pa. _8i (1891), construction of elevated railroad in a city;
injunction refused, xemble. Injunction refused in these cases, where legisla-
tive grant of powers held ample; Bigler v. Penna. Canal Co., 177 Pa. 28
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the jurisdiction of the court is at an end, and further inquiry is
to be made by the Commonwealth. The other is that the land-
owner may set up facts outside the charter, and the court may
be justified by those facts in restraining the exercise of the
power conferred by the legislature. The burden is on the land-
owner of showing clearly that the power conferred should not be
exercised.
5 2
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia, Pa.
(1896); Chew v. Phila., 257" Pa. 589 (1917); Hespenheide's Appeal, 4 Penny.
71 (Pa. i884), power of eminent domain of lessee of railroad; Brumbaugh v.
Power Co., 254 Pa. 215 (1916), bill filed after bond filed in the statutory pro-
ceedings; Jacob v. Water Co., 220 Pa. 388 (i9oS); Boyd v. Negley, 53 Pa.
387 (1,86), lateral railroad located, viewers appointed damages assessed, con-
struction begun and owner filed bill to restrain building. Dismissed. Owner
averred: a. That the road was not being built, on the route located. Court
found that it was, and that if the proceedings did not describe tie road
located, the error was amendable, and not to be considered at this late date. b,
That the grade of the road had been changed. The court found no evi-
dence of such change. Burkhard v. Water Co., 234 Pa. 41 (912), the court
refused an injunction after discussing questions whether there had been
an effort to agree and whether the power had been exhausted by a previous
condemnation, but said the owner could not set up the unconstitutionality of
act of incorporation. Hey v. Water Co., 207 Pa. 38 (i9O3), where condemning
company was proposing to supply in the territories of twelve other compares'
the court examined the question of whether the defendant company could law-
fully acquire by purchase the franchise of the other companies and whether
it had acquired the powers of the other companies. Both questions were
answered in the affirmative, and injunction refused. In Young v. Transmis-
sion Co., 32 Pa. Co. Ct. 81 (19o6), the owner filed a bill contending inter
alia, that the defendant company was incorporated under an act of assembly
which did not give it the power to make the entry in question. This company
set up a charter under another act. Held that the court was bound by the pro-
vision of the charter as to the act of incorporation, but injunction issued on
grotind that defendant was without authority to occupy without local consent.
" Deemer v. R .R. Co., 212 Pa. 491 (i9o5) ; Pioneer Coal Co. v. I. R. Co.,
272 Pa. 43 (1922).
